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Treating Offshore Submerged Lands as Public Lands:  
A Historical Perspective 
By Robin Kundis Craig* 
ABSTRACT 
When President Harry Truman proclaimed federal control over the 
United States’ continental shelf in 1945, he did so primarily to secure the 
energy resources—oil and gas—embedded in those submerged lands.  
Nevertheless, the mineral wealth of the continental shelf spurred two 
critical legal battles over their control and disposition: first, whether the 
federal government had any interest in the first three miles of continental 
shelf; and second, if so, whether the federal government had authority to 
regulate the continental shelf under traditional federal public land laws, 
such as the Minerals Leasing Act.  Congress’s reactions to federal courts’ 
resolutions of these questions, embodied in 1953 in the Submerged Lands 
Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, continue to provide the 
foundations for state and federal management of the nation’s continental 
shelf and its energy resources. 
Nevertheless, the Outer Continental Shelf’s status as federal 
public lands remains ambiguous.  This Article takes a historical approach 
to assessing that issue, reviewing the traditional definition of federal 
“public lands” and the historical context of the public lands issues that 
arose for the Outer Continental Shelf.  It concludes that the Outer 
Continental Shelf, from a natural resources perspective, qualifies as the 
newest of the federal public lands, but it also acknowledges that—unlike 
for many other public lands—federal statutes repeatedly and consistently 
exclude the states from gaining ownership of those submerged lands. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  The United States controls vast areas of offshore territory—indeed, 
including the sea around the nation’s island territories, the United States’ 
offshore interests are larger than its terrestrial interests.1  The resources of 
these offshore areas are similarly vast and rich, from the fishery resources 
of the United States’ 200-nautical-mile wide Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ)2  to the oil (petroleum) and natural gas resources lying beneath its 
continental shelf.3  Indeed, in 1953, as the United States was first asserting 
                                                          
 1.  U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st 
Century iii, 30-31 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 USCOP Report]. 
 2.  Id. at 274-75. 
 3.  Id. at 352, 353. 
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clear regulatory authority over the Outer Continental Shelf, Warren 
Christopher noted that “[t]he mineral resources and food potential of this 
area have been said to make its acquisition more important to the nation 
than the Louisiana Purchase.”4 
The United States has asserted control over its outer continental 
shelf since at least 1945, when President Harry Truman issued a 
presidential proclamation to that effect.5  Without question, the mineral 
energy resources beneath the continental shelf have always been a 
substantial motivating force for the United States to assert control over 
those offshore submerged lands.6  Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to view 
the U.S. law of the continental shelf as the law of offshore oil and gas 
development, as this Article should make clear.  That law evolved once in 
the 1930s through 1950s to accommodate and clarify the rules regarding 
offshore oil and gas development, from regulatory jurisdiction to royalty 
arrangements to leasing requirements.  More recently, the law of the 
continental shelf has been evolving again to acknowledge the other 
potential energy resources offshore, such as offshore wind farms, thermal 
exchange, and wave and current energy.7  This most recent evolution in 
offshore energy law, however, builds off the first, rendering the 1930s to 
1950s a particularly interesting three decades for assessing the legal status 
of the continental shelf. 
That status, it turns out, became and continues to be highly 
contextual, particularly with regard to the status of the continental shelf as 
“public lands.”  As Bob Armstrong, then Assistant Secretary for Land and 
Minerals, U.S. Department of the Interior, noted in 1997: 
 
While many people do not think of the submerged lands 
of our nation's outer continental shelf as public lands, the 
United States has jurisdiction over the nearly 2 billion 
acres of the seabed and subsoil of our submerged lands.  
Congress, in 1978, declared that those lands were “a vital 
national resource reserve held by the Federal government 
for the public, which should be made available for 
                                                          
 4.  Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to 
a New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 23 (Dec. 1953). 
 5.  Pres. Procl. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945). 
 6.  See Part II, infra, and accompanying notes. 
 7.  2004 USCOP Report, supra n. 1, at 364-68. 
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expeditious and orderly development, subject to 
environmental safeguards....” 43 U.S.C. § 1332.  In 1996, 
the United States received over $3.5 billion in leasing and 
royalty revenue from oil and gas and other minerals from 
these offshore public lands.8 
Congress and the Supreme Court have largely resolved the basic 
issues of which government—the relevant coastal state or the federal 
government—has jurisdiction to regulate offshore activities in specific 
locations.  Nevertheless, the status of the federally-controlled portions of 
the continental shelf (generally referred to as the Outer Continental Shelf, 
or OCS) remains variable.  The federal OCS includes the submerged lands 
subject to U.S. control more than three miles out to sea in most places, or 
three marine leagues off the Gulf of Mexico coasts of Texas and Florida.9 
This Article examines the contextualized status of the continental 
shelf as “public lands” and potential import of that status from a historical 
perspective.  It begins in Part I with a quick examination of what the 
federal public lands are and why “public lands” status matters.  Part II then 
examines the two significant controversies that arose with respect to the 
continental shelf beginning in the 1930s and continuing until Congress 
enacted both the Submerged Lands Act10 and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act11 in 1953.  The first issue was who owned and/or controlled the 
first three miles of ocean—the states or the federal government?  
Assuming that the federal government had some authority over at least 
some parts of the continental shelf, the second issue was whether the 
federal government had authority, pursuant to its terrestrial public lands 
mineral statutes, to lease areas of the continental shelf for oil and gas 
development. 
Parts III and IV then turn to Congress’s responses to this 
litigation.  Part III examines the legislative history of both the Submerged 
Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act for evidence of how 
Congress was thinking about the continental shelf, especially the OCS, in 
relation to other mineral- and energy-producing federal public lands.  Part 
IV, in turn, examines OCS-relevant federal law since 1953, in statutes as 
                                                          
 8.  Bob Armstrong, Our Federal Public Lands, 12 Nat. Resources & Env. 
3, 4 (Summer 1997). 
 9.  2004 USCOP Report, supra n. 1, at 70-71. 
 10.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2006). 
 11.  Id. at §§ 1331-1356a. 
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diverse as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971,12 the Federal 
Lands Policy Management Act of 1976,13 the Abandoned Shipwreck Act 
of 1987,14 and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.  The Article 
concludes that the continental shelf’s—and even just the OCS’s—legal 
status as public lands depends significantly on the exact context and the 
exact legal question that is being asked.  In the context of offshore oil and 
gas exploration and development, however, the OCS should be viewed as 
public lands, even though Congress has made no provision for conveying 
title to those lands into private ownership. 
II. THE IMPORT OF “PUBLIC LANDS” STATUS 
  The status of any submerged lands, and especially the OCS, as 
federal public lands is not particularly intuitive.  Nor has the subject been 
the focus of extensive general litigation.  There are several good reasons 
for this gap.  First, under the federal Equal Footing Doctrine and principles 
of state title, states took title to the submerged beds and banks of 
navigable fresh waters and all tidally influenced coastal waters as they 
became states.15  As a result, these two very important sets of submerged 
lands are not federal lands16—although they may constitute, under the 
relevant state’s land, public lands of the state.17  Second, the submerged 
lands beneath non-navigable fresh waters generally belong to the private 
riparian landowners adjacent to the water body.18  As a result, these 
                                                          
 12.  Id. at §§ 1601-1629h (2006). 
 13.  Id. at §§ 1701-1782 (2006). 
 14.  Id. at §§ 2101-2106 (2006). 
 15.  PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227-28 (2012) 
(citations omitted). 
 16.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally described these 
submerged lands as “pre-reserved” to the states and hence as subject to the rule that 
federal public lands do not include lands reserved for a specific purpose. See Scott v. 
Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 111-12 (1905) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 38 (1894); 
Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894)). 
 17.  See e.g., Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212-13 (N.C. App. 
2010) (including navigable waters as state public lands); Walton County v. Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1109-13 (Fla. 2008) (describing in detail 
the nature of the coastal public lands below the mean high water line). But see 
Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 962-68 (Alaska 1995) (holding that, in general, 
navigable waters and the lands under them are not public lands). 
 18.  See e.g. Mesenbrink v. Hosterman, 210 P.2d 515, 519-20 (Idaho 2009) 
(describing the devolution of title to the submerged lands of nonnavigable water 
bodies from the federal government to private riparian landowners); Orr v. Mortvedt, 
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submerged lands are usually not in any kind of public ownership, 
obviating the public lands issue. Finally, the offshore continental shelf, 
and especially the OCS, did not become significantly important 
economically—and hence legally—until the mid-1930s, with increasing 
importance after World War II.19  As a result, many of the 19th- and 20th-
century court decisions, federal statutes, and Executive Branch actions 
regarding federal public lands simply did not consider the submerged 
lands beneath the oceans. 
Complicating the issue even further is the fact that “public lands” 
has different meanings in different contexts.  For example, as a matter of 
federal common law, as George Coggins and Robert Glicksman have 
emphasized, “[t]he meaning of the term ‘public lands’ has varied greatly . 
. . . In common parlance, the term simply means all lands owned by the 
United States.”20  To the extent that the federal courts settled on a specific 
common-law definition, however, they indicated that federal public lands 
are federally owned lands that are available—albeit often through federal 
regulation—for general public use and for acquisition of private property 
rights.  Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has emphasized that federal 
public lands cannot include lands reserved by Congress or the Executive 
for specific purposes, such as tribal reservations or national parks.21  
Instead, it has suggested that federal public lands must be “unqualifiedly 
subject to sale and disposition”22 or “subject to sale or other disposal 
under general laws.”23 
Traditionally, this definition has also delineated the import of 
“public lands” status.  Unlike other kinds of federal lands, such as reserved 
lands, federal agencies could readily give private citizens (or, in some 
cases, the states) some interest—title or “other disposal”—in the federal 
                                                                                                                                    
735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007) (“The navigable or nonnavigable status of a 
watercourse generally determines whether the bed of a watercourse is owned by the 
state or by private parties.”). 
 19.  United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 37-39 (1947). 
 20.  George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural 
Resources Law vol. 1, § 1.13 (2d ed., West 2012). 
 21.  Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955) 
(holding that the Warm Springs Indian Reservation and other reserved federal lands 
are not “public lands”); United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938); United 
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 206 (1926); Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 111-12 
(1905); Missouri, Kansas & Topeka Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 118-19 (1894); 
Wilcox v. Jackson ex dem. McConnel, 38 U.S. 498, 513 (1839). 
 22.  O’Donnell, 303 U.S. at 510. 
 23.  Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875). 
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public lands.  Such interests, historically, have ranged from title patents in 
formerly federal lands24 to timber sales25 to mineral leases.26  Viewed 
from this perspective, offshore submerged lands, and especially the OCS, 
should qualify as at least a form of federal public lands, especially in light 
of Coggins’ and Glicksman’s recognition that the evolution of the law 
governing federal lands has rendered “the common law definitions [of 
‘public lands’] obsolete.”27  Instead, the status of the OCS is best 
evaluated through the rich history and thick lens of the statutes that now 
govern its use and management.  That history, as Part II will explore, 
begins with the rather sudden desire in the 1920s through 1940s to develop 
the energy resources that lay buried off the United States’ coasts, 
especially in the Gulf of Mexico and off California. 
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONTINENTAL 
SHELF CONTROVERSIES 
  Immediately before and especially after World War II, all facets of 
U.S. society viewed development of the United States’ offshore 
petroleum, and to a lesser extent natural gas, resources as being critical to 
both our national security and our economic well-being.28  The oil 
business was also, of course, incredibly lucrative.  Beginning in the mid-
1930s in particular, this new interest in offshore oil and gas drove two 
significant legal controversies, one pitting coastal states against the federal 
government for control over continental shelf energy development and one 
questioning the federal government’s actual authority under existing 
public lands statutes to regulate offshore oil and gas development.  Both of 
these controversies helped to shape the status of offshore submerged lands 
as “public lands.” 
                                                          
 24.  The federal government has issued land patents under a variety of 
federal statutes. These include: Coal Lands Act of 1909, 30 U.S.C. § 81 (2006); Coal 
Lands Act of 1910, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (2006); Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 325-329 
(2006); Indian Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. § 190 (2006); Mineral Lands Act, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 22 (2006); Stock Raising Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. § 299 (2006); and Swamp 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 982-984 (2006), among others. 
 25.  16 U.S.C. § 472a (2006). 
 26.  Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (2006); Materials 
Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2006). 
 27.  Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 18, at § 1.13. 
 28.  See discussions infra. 
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A. Jurisdiction over the First Three Miles of Ocean, Including Its 
Submerged Lands 
  Beginning in the 1930s, the revenues to be made from the leasing 
of offshore lands for oil development sparked a series of long and bitter 
legal battles between coastal states—notably, California, Louisiana, 
Florida, and Texas29—and the federal government for control over 
offshore oil and gas development.  Many of these controversies were 
sparked around 1937, when oil prospectors and their attorneys applied to 
the U.S. Department of the Interior for permission to explore for and 
develop offshore oil and gas resources under the federal Mineral Leasing 
Act, insisting that the federal government, not states, had the legal 
authority to regulate oil and gas prospecting, even in the first three miles 
of ocean.30 
  As a legal matter, reasonable minds differed over which 
government owned and/or controlled the first three miles of ocean.31  As a 
practical matter, however, those who emphasized the federal government’s 
pervasive laissez-faire attitude toward the oceans—except where its 
interests in national security, national defense, international relations, or 
national commerce were directly concerned, which was a relatively rare 
event during the 19th-century United States’ overall isolationist approach 
to the world—probably had the better of the argument.32  Coastal states 
                                                          
 29.  See generally, e.g., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) 
(holding that the United States controlled oil deposits off the coast of Texas); United 
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) (holding that the United States controlled oil 
deposits off the coast of Louisiana). 
 30.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 31.  See supra note 29 and the cases cited therein. 
 32.  As the House of Representatives emphasized, for example: 
Many attorneys general have approved, over a period of 100 years, 
as required by law, the title to the submerged coastal lands granted 
to the United States by the States. The War and Navy Departments 
have treated these lands as owned by the States since the 
Departments originated most of the requests for State grants of 
such lands to the United States. In some 30 opinions, from 1900 to 
1937, the Department of the Interior ruled that ownership of the 
soil in the 3-mile belt was in the respective States. 
H.R. Rpt. 83-215 (March 27, 1953) (reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1427). See 
also id. at 1428 (quoting from these opinions).  Moreover, “[a]s late as 1933, the then 
Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, in refusing to grant a Federal oil ease on 
lands under the Pacific Ocean within the boundaries of California, recognized: ’Title 
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had exercised fairly plenary authority in regulating offshore coastal 
activities such as fishing, sand and gravel mining, and, as oil and gas 
became increasingly important, offshore oil and gas leasing, with little to 
no interference from the federal government until the 1930s.  Moreover, 
the formal federal law descriptions of many coastal states’ boundaries, 
especially on the Pacific coast and along the Gulf of Mexico, seemed to 
confirm state jurisdiction over a band of coastal waters and the 
corresponding continental shelf.33 
 
Nevertheless, the battle over which government controlled the 
continental shelf was hard fought in all three branches of the federal 
government.  In general, the majority of Congress sided with the states, 
while the Executive, especially under President Truman, strongly asserted 
the federal government’s rights, aided by minority support in Congress.  
Thus, for example, “[i]n 1938 and 1939 the Congress failed to enact 
legislation asserting ownership of submerged lands in the Federal 
Government, and in 1946 the Congress confirmed States’ ownership of 
such lands by enactment of House Joint Resolution 225, which was vetoed 
by President Truman.”34   
  It was the U.S. Supreme Court, however, that gave the first 
decisive answer to the question of which government controlled the ocean.  
                                                                                                                                    
to the soil under the ocean within the 3-mile limit is in the State of California, and the 
land may not be appropriated except by authority of the State.’” Id. at 1417. 
 33.  As the House of Representatives summarized in 1953: 
In 1850 Congress approved the constitutional boundaries of 
California upon its admission to the Union. Its boundaries were 
specifically described as extending 3 miles into the Pacific Ocean.  
In 1859 Congress admitted Oregon into the Union with its 
constitutional boundaries specifically defined as being 1 marine 
league from its coast line.  In 1868 Congress approved the 
Constitution of Florida, in which its boundaries were defined as 
extending 3 marine leagues seaward and a like distance into the 
Gulf of Mexico.  Texas’ boundary was fixed 3 marine leagues into 
the Gulf of Mexico at the time it was admitted to the Union in 1845 
by the annexation agreement.  In 1889 Congress approved the 
Constitution of the State of Washington, which defined its 
boundary as extending 1 marine league into the ocean and which 
specifically asserted its ownership to the beds of all navigable 
waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. 
Id. at 1428. 
 34.  Id. 
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On June 23, 1947, in United States v. California,35 it found in favor of the 
federal government.36   
  Like all of the litigation between states and the federal government 
that raised this issue, United States v. California was a fight over which 
sovereign was entitled to the revenues from oil and gas leasing and 
production in the first three miles of the ocean.37  The United States 
claimed title to the submerged lands of this zone in fee simple.38  Against 
California’s assertions of ownership and control over these submerged 
lands based on California’s congressionally ratified constitution and the 
Equal Footing Doctrine,39 the Supreme Court emphasized the federal 
government’s role both in defending the entire nation and in negotiating 
international relations with the rest of the world.40  It then framed the 
issue for resolution as not being about legal title but rather “whether the 
state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to 
determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign 
or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea, 
known or hereafter discovered may be exploited.”41 
The Court rested its decision in the federal government’s favor on 
four major grounds.  First, “[a]t the time this country won its 
independence from England there was no settled international custom or 
understanding among nations that each nation owned a three-mile water 
belt along its borders.”42  As a result, the original 13 colonies-cum-states 
did not inherit a three-mile zone of ocean from England, giving California 
no claim to such a zone under the Equal Footing Doctrine.43  Instead, the 
federal government established the nation’s claims to this three-mile zone 
significantly later in the nation’s history.44 
Second, “[n]ot only has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile 
belt, been accomplished by the national Government, but protection and 
control of it has been and is a function of national external sovereignty.”45  
                                                          
 35.  332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
 36.  Id. at 40-41. 
 37.  Id. at 22-23. 
 38.  Id. at 22. 
 39.  Id. at 23. 
 40.  Id. at 29. 
 41.   California, 332 U.S. at 29. 
 42.  Id. at 32. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 33-34. 
 45.  Id. at 34. 
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Control over this belt of ocean, the Court concluded, was subject to the 
traditional international law rule of freedom of the seas.46  As a result, 
national control could be secured only through international negotiation 
and perhaps treaty, actions that were clearly the federal government’s 
prerogative.47  Indeed, the Court pointed out, “[t]he very oil about which 
the state and nation here contend might well become the subject of 
international dispute and settlement.”48 
Third, the Supreme Court determined that its prior case law 
governing the ownership of submerged lands beneath the internal 
navigable waters, under which title usually goes to the states, did not apply 
at sea.49  According to the Court, none of these prior cases squarely 
decided the issue of which government controls the first three miles of 
ocean, which had become an issue only with the recent advent of offshore 
oil and gas development.50  
Finally, California had argued that, even if the federal government 
originally had title to the first three miles of continental shelf, that 
government had lost title to California as a result of prescription, federal 
acquiescence, estoppel, laches, and/or res judicata.51  In fact, the Court 
concluded, neither California nor the federal government had shown much 
interest in the three-mile belt until recently, when oil became important.52  
In any case, California could not assert equitable doctrines against the 
United States, “which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all 
the people [and] is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary 
court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually 
owned pieces of property . . . .”53 
Thus, the federal government won the case.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that “we decide for the reasons we have stated that California is 
not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that the 
Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and 
power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the 
resources of the soil under that water area, including oil.”54  However, as 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 34-35. 
 47.  California, 332 U.S. at 35. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 36-39. 
 50.  Id. at 37-39. 
 51.  Id. at 24. 
 52.  Id. at 39. 
 53.  California, 332 U.S. at 40. 
 54.  Id. at 38-39. 
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this statement indicates, the Court did not clearly settle legal title to the 
continental shelf in the United States.  Instead, it emphasized only that 
“national rights are paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the three-
mile belt”55 and that “the nation has paramount rights in and power over 
this ocean belt . . . .”56  
Nevertheless, at the very end of United States v. California, the 
Supreme Court did appear to acknowledge that the continental shelf was 
federal property.  Specifically, it noted, against California’s fears of 
complete exclusion from continental shelf resources, that it would not 
“assume that Congress, which has constitutional control over Government 
property, will execute its powers in such way as to bring about injustices 
to states, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their 
permission.”57 
 
As a result, while United States v. California left the federal 
government with clear authority and jurisdiction to regulate oil and gas 
development in all of the United States’ continental shelf, the exact status 
of those submerged lands was ambiguous.  Litigation over the federal 
government’s leasing authority, if anything, only underscored that 
ambiguity, leaving much resolution to Congress. 
B. Federal Authority Under Federal Public Land Laws to Lease Offshore 
Submerged Lands for Oil and Gas Development 
 
  The issue of who had title to the continental shelf and control over 
offshore oil and gas deposits was important beginning in the 1930s 
because Congress had already enacted statutes that appeared to regulate 
offshore oil and gas development—if the continental shelf constituted 
federal public lands.  In particular, the federal Mineral Leasing Act of 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 36. 
 56.  Id. at 40. See also Submerged Lands Act a Valid Exercise of 
Congressional Power, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 804, 808 (April 1954) (concluding that the 
Supreme Court in later litigation “would have performed a service if it had clearly 
defined the rights and relationship of both state and federal governments in the areas 
included in the [Submerged Lands] Act. The uncertainties remaining due to the 
summary nature of the opinion are an invitation to litigation, or even attempts at new 
legislation, which might act to delay and impede the exploitation of resources vital to 
the economy and defense of the nation.”). 
 57.  California, 332 U.S. at 40. (emphasis added). 
TREATING OFFSHORE SUBMERGED LANDS AS PUBLIC LANDS 63 
192058 governs disposition of mineral rights by the federal government 
for: 
Deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, oil 
shale, gilsonite (including all vein-type solid 
hydrocarbons), or gas, and lands containing such deposits 
owned by the United States, including those in national 
forests, but excluding lands acquired under the 
Appalachian Forest Act, approved March 1, 1911 (36 
Stat. 961), and those in incorporated cities, towns, and 
villages and in national parks and monuments, those 
acquired under other Acts subsequent to February 25, 
1920, and lands within the naval petroleum and oil-shale 
reserves . . . .59 
Therefore, if the federal government owned the nation’s offshore oil and 
gas deposits, the Act would seem to apply. 
  Individuals seeking to prospect for offshore oil certainly believed 
that this statute governed and repeatedly applied to the U.S. Department of 
the Interior for the requisite permits and leases.  For example, in 1937 
Robert E. Lee Jones applied to the Department of the Interior, through its 
Los Angeles Land Office, for oil and gas leases off the coast of 
California.60  The Department denied his application on the grounds that it 
lacked jurisdiction over those offshore tracts, and, after appealing to the 
Secretary of the Interior, Jordan sued in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia to compel the Department to issue the leases.61  The 
district court ducked the merits of the case, noting the ongoing litigation 
over which government controlled the continental shelf but concluding 
that, regardless, it lacked authority to compel the Secretary of the Interior 
to engage in so discretionary an action as issuing mineral leases.62 
  Similarly, in 1934 Deryl L. Mayhew applied to the Department for 
a permit to prospect for oil on approximately 1,600 acres of submerged 
lands off the coast of California.63  Again, the Secretary of the Interior 
                                                          
 58.  30 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (2006). 
 59.  Id. at § 181. 
 60.  United States ex rel. Jordan v. Ickes, 55 F. Supp. 875, 875 (D.D.C. 
1943). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 875-76. 
 63.  Mayhew v. Krug, 98 F. Supp. 338, 338 (D.D.C. 1951). 
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denied the permit on the grounds that California, not the United States, 
controlled the lands at issue.64  Despite the fact that it was deciding the 
case in 1951, four years after the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. California, the D.C. District Court held the case in abeyance in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over United 
States v. California to resolve further issues.65  However, it also noted that 
the Secretary of the Interior, on behalf of the United States, was arguing in 
defense that the Mineral Leasing Act “does not apply to land lying beneath 
the marginal sea because such is not public land.”66 
  Indeed, even after United States v. California, the U.S. Department 
of the Interior continued to reject applications for leases under the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act for offshore submerged lands.  The legal basis of these 
rejections was the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior’s August 
1947 opinion that the continental shelf was not “public lands” and hence 
that the Mineral Leasing Act did not apply to offshore oil and gas 
development.67  For example, in 1939, Alma Swart applied under the Act 
for a lease of 640 acres of submerged lands off the coast of southern 
California from which the City of Long Beach, pursuant to California law, 
was already pumping oil under a trust relationship with the state; Earl 
Sinclair and Lauren Cherry applied for an adjacent 640-acre tract.68 
Despite United States v. California, the Secretary of the Interior denied the 
applications in 1948.69  
 
  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
Department of the Interior’s interpretation in Justheim v. McKay70  in 
1956—notably, after Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act and 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in 1953, as discussed in the next part.  
Plaintiffs in the case were numerous persons who had applied to the 
Department of the Interior for oil and gas leases for submerged lands off 
the coast of California, within the three-mile belt, all of which applications 
                                                          
 64.  Id. at 338-39. 
 65.  Id. at 340. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Justheim v. McKay, 123 F. Supp. 560, 561 (D.D.C. 1954) (citing 
Opinion No. M-34985, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (Aug. 8, 1947)). 
 68.  Gabrielson v. City of Long Beach, 56 Cal.2d 224, 230, 363 P.2d 883, 
887 (Cal. 1961). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  229 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
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the Secretary of the Interior had denied in 1948.71  When the plaintiffs 
sued the Secretary in federal court, “[t]he District Court concluded that the 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act applied only to public lands and that public 
lands do not include lands beneath the marginal seas.”72  The D.C. Circuit 
adopted the district court’s reasoning almost without comment and 
affirmed.73 
  The district court emphasized the Solicitor for the Department of 
the Interior’s opinion “that the Mineral Leasing Act did not authorize the 
issuance of oil and gas leases on submerged coastal areas below low tide 
off the shores of the United States.”74 As the district court recounted, 
The opinion of the Solicitor was based on the following 
grounds (1) the Mineral Leasing Act is a statute for the 
disposition of public lands, but lands located below the 
high water mark, are not now and never have been 
considered public lands of the United States, (2) lands 
affected by the Act are to be surveyed and described by 
legal subdivisions of the public land surveys and these 
surveys have not heretofore extended beyond the high tide 
line, (3) since there had been no judicial determination 
that these lands belonged to the United States at the time 
of passage of the Act nor at the time of the amendatory 
Act of August 8, 1946, it could not be assumed that 
Congress intended to subject these lands to the provisions 
of the Act.75 
  The public lands argument turned first on what Congress meant by 
“public domain” in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, and the district court 
concluded that the term meant “public lands.”76  The district court then 
noted that: 
Public lands have been generally defined as those lands of 
the United States which are subject to sale or other 
                                                          
 71.  Id. at 29-30. 
 72.  Id. at 30. 
 73.  Id. at 30-31. 
 74.  Justheim, 123 F. Supp. at 561-62 (citing Opinion No. M-34985, 
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (Aug. 8, 1947)). 
 75.  Id. at 561-62. 
 76.  Id. at 562 (citing Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490 (1901)). 
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disposal under general laws.  Not all lands of the United 
States are classified as public lands.  Lands to which 
rights have attached and become vested through full 
compliance with an applicable land law are no longer part 
of the mass of public lands, nor are lands which have been 
reserved or appropriated for some lawful public purpose, 
i.e., National Parks, Military and naval reservation, etc.77 
To support this traditional view of the public laws, the district court traced 
the history of federal mining laws and bills that existed before 1920, 
emphasizing that “[t]here are found in the legislative histories of all these 
bills expressions that the bills are intended to apply to minerals located in 
public lands or those minerals reserved when the public lands were 
patented to individuals.”78  Similarly, during the consideration of the bill 
that became the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, “there were several 
statements which reflect the fact that Congress intended it to apply only to 
the public land minerals. In the House Report on the bill it was made 
unmistakably clear that this was the intention of the bill.”79  Absent from 
the district court’s consideration was the fact that Congress had no real 
reason to think about the continental shelf in these discussions; instead, the 
federal public lands would continue to be what the federal public lands 
always had been: terrestrial. 
  Finally, relying to a great degree on the battle between the federal 
government and the state governments over title to and control over the 
continental shelf in the first three miles of ocean, the court concluded that 
these submerged lands could not be public lands: 
Although there had been no judicial determination of this 
question, it appears that these lands were never considered 
public lands of the United States.  As defined above 
public lands are those lands of the United States which are 
subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.  The 
areas involved in this action were never held open for sale 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 562-63 (citing Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875); 
Bardon v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 145 U.S. 535, 538 (1892); Payne v. Central 
Pacific Ry. Co., 255 U.S. 228, 237 (1921); Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston R.R. 
Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 
181, 206 (1926); Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 114 (1905)). 
 78.  Id. at 564. 
 79.  Id. 
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or other disposal. Furthermore, the public land surveys 
were never extended beyond the high tide line and it has 
been held that unsurveyed lands are not public lands of 
the United States.  Rather than being considered public 
lands of the United States it appears that for many years 
these areas were believed to be the property of the 
adjacent state.  This belief resulted from a series of cases 
which raised questions as to whether lands covered by 
inland waters and tidelands were public lands. In holding 
that tidelands were not public lands, the Court used such 
strong language that it was believed all submerged lands 
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State were State 
property, regardless of whether they were tidelands, lands 
covered by inland waters or marginal sea lands.80 
  In other words, the continental shelf could not be federal public 
lands because everyone had always believed that it belonged to the states.  
While United States v. California “established the interest of the Federal 
Government in these lands,” it “did not hold that they were subject to lease 
under the Mineral Leasing Act.”81  (Of course, the Mineral Leasing Act 
issue was not before the Court.)  The district court also emphasized that 
the Supreme Court had not clearly established the federal government as 
the owner in fee of the offshore submerged lands, underscoring the point 
that these lands could not be public lands.82  Finally, “[a]lthough Congress 
had on several occasions extended the applicability of the Mineral Leasing 
Act to lands which were not within the scope of the original act, it has not 
taken any action specifically to include submerged coastal lands within the 
provisions of the act.”83 
  In the wake of United States v. California, therefore, the judiciary 
and the Executive were in agreement that the United States’ newly 
acquired coastal submerged lands were not “public lands,” especially not 
with regard to the Mineral Leasing Act.  However, as the district court in 
Justheim acknowledged, Congress can add territory to the federal public 
lands; to hold otherwise would be to limit forever the federal public lands 
to the territory that the United States owned at some particular point in 
                                                          
 80.  Justheim, 123 F. Supp. at 565. 
 81.  Id. at 566. 
 82.  Id. at 567. 
 83.  Id. at 568. 
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history.  Moreover, the continental shelf of the United States could (and 
arguably still can) properly be considered a new territorial acquisition: 
President Truman’s Proclamation extended the United States’ claim to its 
continental shelf under the high seas in 1945;84 the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. California in 1947; and the international law 
governing coastal jurisdiction continued to evolve through the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which recognized 
coastal nations’ claims to at least 200 miles of continental shelf as a matter 
of treaty,85 and which the United States (a non-party) claims represents 
customary international law.86 
  As a result, the district court’s and D.C. Circuit’s decisions in 
Justheim and the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior’s 1947 
opinion on the Mineral Leasing Act are best viewed as temporal rather 
than absolute judgments regarding the continental shelf’s status as federal 
public lands, particularly with regard to the OCS more than three miles out 
to sea—that is, that these were opinions that offshore submerged lands 
were not federal public lands yet.  Therefore, the continental shelf’s status 
must be evaluated in light of the legislation that Congress enacted in 1953 
in response to United States v. California and the Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act litigation.  It is to those statutes that this Article now turns. 
IV. THE PASSAGE OF THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT AND THE 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT 
  While the federal courts provided the first round of resolutions to 
both the jurisdictional and the federal leasing authority questions for the 
continental shelf, Congress soon responded with two pieces of legislation 
intended to “fix” those judicial conclusions. It passed both statutes—the 
Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act—in 
1953, and the legislative history supporting their enactment provides 
interesting historical insights into Congress’ view of the continental shelf 
as public lands. 
                                                          
 84.  Pres. Procl. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945). 
 85.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 76-85 (Dec. 10, 
1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 86.  E.g. Pub. L. No. 104-43, § 401(1), 109 Stat. 389 (Aug. 27, 1954) 
(characterizing the prior U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as incorporating the 
customary international law right of passage); National Policy for the Oceans, Our 
Coasts, and the Great Lakes, 74 Fed. Reg. 28591-28592 (June 12, 2009). 
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A. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 
  In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States 
v. California,87 Congress decided to “correct”88 the Court’s holding by 
“returning”89 the first three miles of ocean submerged lands to the coastal 
states.90  It accomplished this goal through the Submerged Lands Act of 
1953.91  As enacted, the Submerged Lands Act declares the national 
interest:  
that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath 
navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective 
States, and the natural resources within such lands and 
waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, 
lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural 
resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, 
and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, 
                                                          
 87.  332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
 88.  See H.R. Rpt. 83-215 (March 27, 1953) (reprinted in 1953 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1419-25) (questioning the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s 
decision and describing all of the problems that it created as justifying congressional 
legislation). 
 89.  See id. at 1417-19 (emphasizing that “[t]hroughout our Nation’s history 
the States have been in possession of and exercising all the rights and attributes of 
ownership in the lands and resources beneath the navigable waters within their 
boundaries,” cataloging Congress’s attempts to preserve this ownership against the 
Executive Branch, and characterizing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
California as “establish[ing] the law differently from what eminent jurists, lawyers, 
and public officials for more than a century had believed it to be, but also differently 
from what the Supreme Court apparently had believed it to be.”). 
 90.  See id. at 1385 (noting that the purpose of the legislation was to “to 
confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within 
State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, and to 
provide for the use and control of said lands and resources and the resources of the 
outer Continental Shelf”); see also id. at 1388-89 (summarizing Title II of the 
proposed legislation as “declar[ing] that it is in the public interest that title and 
ownership of lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective 
States and of the natural resources therein be in the respective States.  It provides in 
addition to but also distinct from title and ownership that the rights and power to 
administer, lease, control, develop, and use such lands and resources under applicable 
State laws and in accordance with the terms of the bill.”) 
 91.  Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (May 22, 1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301-1315 (2006)). 
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confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the 
respective States . . . .92 
The Act released all of the federal government’s title and claim to the first 
three miles of offshore submerged lands,93 with the exceptions of the 
federal government’s authority and right to regulate such waters for 
navigation, flood control, and power94 and of the submerged lands to 
which the federal government had already acquired or reserved title.95  In 
addition, the United States retained: 
all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of 
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters 
for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, 
national defense, and international affairs, all of which 
shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, 
proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of 
management, administration, leasing, use, and 
development of the lands and natural resources which are 
specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and 
vested in and assigned to the respective States and others . 
. . .96 
 Because the Submerged Lands Act gave control to the states, it largely 
avoided the “public lands” quandary. Instead, the Act works on “lands 
beneath navigable waters,” which it defined to be: 
(1) all lands within the boundaries of each of the 
respective States which are covered by nontidal waters 
that were navigable under the laws of the United States at 
the time such State became a member of the Union, or 
acquired sovereignty over such lands and waters 
thereafter, up to the ordinary high water mark as 
                                                          
 92.  43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).  For a contemporary history of the 
Submerged Lands Act, see generally Aaron L. Shalowitz, Boundary Problems Raised 
by the Submerged Lands Act, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1021 (1954). 
 93.  Id. at § 1311(b). 
 94.  Id. at § 1311(d). 
 95.  Id. at § 1313. 
 96.  Id. at § 1314(a). 
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heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and 
reliction; 
 
(2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal 
waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and 
seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the 
coast line of each such State and to the boundary line of 
each such State where in any case such boundary as it 
existed at the time such State became a member of the 
Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends 
seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three 
geographical miles, and 
 
(3) all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly 
were lands beneath navigable waters . . . .97 
  After the Submerged Lands Act, therefore, “lands beneath 
navigable waters”—including offshore submerged lands out to (for most 
states98) three miles—thus belong to the coastal states.  In contrast, the 
United States claimed for itself “the natural resources of that portion of the 
subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying seaward and outside of 
the area of lands beneath navigable waters,”99 effectively confirming the 
Supreme Court’s United States v. California opinion for the OCS.  
  While the Submerged Lands Act preserves all rights acquired in 
submerged laws pursuant to other laws, it also disclaims that it constitutes 
or incorporates any interpretation that any other federal laws apply.100  In 
other words, the Act expressly leaves open the question of whether the 
submerged lands of the OCS should be considered “public lands” for other 
federal law purposes. 
  Undoubted, members of Congress sincerely believed that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had simply gotten the law wrong and states should be 
entitled to control the first three miles of continental shelf and coastal 
waters, subject to some specific reservations of federal authority and 
                                                          
 97.  Id. at § 1301(a). 
 98.  43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006) (allowing states to press more extensive 
claims to offshore submerged lands based on historic ownership or control). Only 
Florida and Texas succeeded, in the Gulf of Mexico. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL 
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 99.  Id. at § 1302. 
 100.  Id. at § 1315. 
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title.101  Nevertheless, one of the key motivations for the Submerged 
Lands Act was to ensure the rapid and steady development of offshore 
petroleum by ending much of the litigation.  For example, the House of 
Representatives’ committee report on the new legislation waxed quite 
poetic about the “almost interminable debate over the disposition of these 
submerged lands” and the resulting “acute and vital necessity of the 
immediate enactment of legislation to promote the exploration and 
development of the petroleum deposits known to be located in these 
areas.”102  It further emphasized “[t]he strategic importance of oil to our 
economy and our defense efforts,” which “demand immediate action to 
alleviate a growing menace to our national welfare.”103  Continuing 
litigation over control of these submerged lands, however, brought 
offshore petroleum development to a virtual standstill, particularly in the 
Gulf of Mexico.104  Similarly, the Senate’s report on the legislation 
emphasized the great wealth lying beneath the continental shelf and its 
importance to national defense.105 
                                                          
 101.  See H.R. Rpt. 83-215, supra n. 86, at 1429-32 (describing the equities 
of granting these submerged lands to the states). 
 102.  Id. at 1386. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. (“Since the court decisions in the cases involving the States of 
California, Louisiana, and Texas, new development of the vast potentialities located in 
these lands has been brought almost to a complete standstill, particularly in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  The litigation which was the primary cause of these stoppages threatens to 
further retard any progress.  Therefore, the committee feels that permanent legislation 
covering all phases of this litigation must be enacted.”).  See also id. at 1396 (stating, 
in an appendix report generated from prior attempts at similar legislation, that “[t]his 
controversy, originating in 1938, has been before the Seventy-fifth, Seventy-sixth, 
Seventy-ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-first, and Eighty-second Congresses.  The longer it 
continues, the more vexatious and confused it becomes.  Interminable litigation has 
arisen between the States and the Federal Government, between applicants for leases 
under the Federal Mineral Leasing Act and the Departments of Justice and Interior, 
and between the States and their lessees.  Much-needed improvements on these lands 
and the development of strategic natural resources within them have been seriously 
retarded.”); id. at 1397 (describing how litigation that began in 1950 had brought oil 
and gas development in the Gulf of Mexico to a “standstill”). 
 105.  Sen. Rpt. 83-133 (Mar. 27, 1953) (reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1471, 1534) (“Great wealth lies beneath the waters off the shores of our Nation.  The 
oil supply is the richest of the treasures that have been so far discovered.  It is one of 
the richest discoveries of natural wealth in the history of the United States.  In 
addition, vast reserves of natural gas, sulfur, and other resources, some discovered 
only recently, bring the total value of the known resources in this rich submerged area 
to many billions of dollars.  The oil supply alone is one of the keys to the defense of 
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  Beyond the need to end the conflicts was also the fact that the 
states were better positioned at the time to promote offshore petroleum 
development.  As the House of Representatives explained in its report on 
the legislation that became the Submerged Lands Act, “[y]ears have been 
spent by the States in working out legislation, rules, and regulations, and 
details of procedure and practices governing the geophysical work, leasing 
methods and drilling problems involved in this new and hazardous type of 
oil exploration.  . . .  The States have established and maintain 
departments, technical staffs, and experienced personnel to handle these 
matters and supervise these activities.”106  In contrast, “[i]f the submerged 
lands are transferred from State to Federal control, the Federal 
Government will have to begin from scratch.  . . .  The ownership of the 
submerged lands off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana and other coastal 
States will have to be determined by litigation.  . . .  At present there is not 
even a law under which the Federal Government could operate these 
lands.”107  As a result, “[t]he committee believes that failure to continue 
existing State control will result in delaying for an indefinite time the 
intensive development now under way on these lands and that any delay 
is, in the words of Secretary Forrestal, ‘contrary to the best interest of the 
United States from the viewpoint of national security.’”108 Finally,  
No evidence was presented to show that the Federal 
Government could do a better job in administering the 
submerged lands than the States are doing.  The evidence 
is overwhelming that State control is not only adequate 
but is desirable.  Geological, engineering, and physical 
conditions in oil production vary greatly not only from 
State to State, but also from field to field within a State.  
Different practices and procedures have been established 
to fit the peculiar local needs.109 
 
                                                                                                                                    
our country and of the entire free world.  Planes, tanks, and ships—all of these major 
instruments of modern warfare—are useful only if there is enough oil to keep them in 
motion.”). 
 106.  H.R. Rpt. 83-215, supra n. 86, at 1433. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
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  The House committee report on the Submerged Lands Act 
legislation also suggests that the House considered submerged lands—at 
least those owned by the federal government—to be public lands.  First, 
the proposed legislation specifically exempted from transfer to the states 
submerged lands that the United States owned as part of the public 
lands,110 indicating that the OCS was both federal and a form of public 
lands.  Second, part of the House’s defense of giving states control over 
the first three miles of offshore submerged lands also evidenced its view 
than the OCS constituted public lands just like government-owned 
terrestrial lands.  Specifically, the House committee looked to evidence 
from oil and gas production from these more traditional public lands to 
argue that states should be left in control of the offshore submerged lands: 
In the five public land States producing oil and gas, the 
Federal Government owns approximately 36 1/2 percent 
of the acreage but produces only about 13 percent of the 
oil and gas produced in these States.  The 1946 total 
production from these lands was approximately 
62,000,000 barrels, while the production from State and 
privately owned lands in the same States was in excess of 
380,000,000 barrels.  Thus, it will be seen that in these 
five ‘public land’ States, where Federal- and State-owned 
lands are in direct competition with each other, 
development has been much faster and production has 
been much greater under State regulation than under 
Federal control.  The total annual production of oil from 
the vast federally owned domain in 1946 was less than 12 
days’ production of the Nation.  It must be conceded that 
the Federal Government has made a pitiful showing with 
respect to the development of public lands for oil and gas 
purposes.111 
Thus, at least as far as energy development was concerned, the House 
committee viewed the continental shelf as being equivalent to terrestrial 
public lands, whether state- or federal-owned.  Moreover, in its opinion, 
the return of the first three miles to the states would create both state-
owned public lands and federal public lands off the nation’s coasts that 
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were capable of mineral development, just as mineral development 
occurred on both state and federal terrestrial public lands. 
 
B. The House of Representatives’ Federal Leasing Provisions Intended 
for the Submerged Lands Act 
  In its version of the Submerged Lands Act, the House of 
Representatives would have addressed federal offshore oil and gas leasing 
more than three miles out to sea (proposed Title III).  The Senate 
eventually struck these provisions from the legislation that became the 
Submerged Lands Act—although such leasing became the core focus of 
the companion Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, discussed below.  
Nevertheless, the House’s report on these provisions provides some 
insight into the status of the Outer Continental Shelf as public lands. 
  The House bill would have addressed oil and gas leasing because 
the House was concerned that failure to assert decisive control over the 
OCS would prejudice the United States’ interests and relationships in the 
international sphere.112  Moreover, the House recognized that the parts of 
the continental shelf given to states were a relatively small part of the total 
continental shelf that the United States had already claimed through 
President Truman’s 1945 Proclamation113: “[t]hat part of the shelf which 
lies within historic State boundaries, or 3 miles in most cases, is estimated 
to contain about 27,000 square miles or less than 10 percent of the total 
area of the shelf . . . .”114  
Notably, therefore, the federal government controlled more than 
90 percent of the potentially developable—for oil and gas—continental 
shelf off the coast of the United States, the OCS. However, as the House 
committee report further noted, “no law now exists whereby the Federal 
Government can lease those submerged lands, the development and 
operation of which are vital to our national economy and security.”115  It 
was Congress’s duty to act so that all that petroleum could be 
developed.116  States, in contrast, could regulate their offshore submerged 
lands through their respective police powers.117 
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One of the telling aspects of the House’s proposed legislation, at 
least so far as the status of the offshore submerged lands as federal public 
lands is concerned, is that the House from the beginning lodged authority 
for offshore oil and gas leasing with the Secretary of the Interior.118  As 
was discussed in Part II, much of the litigation that precipitated the need 
for the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
arose from private parties trying to lease offshore submerged lands for 
mineral development pursuant to the federal Mineral Leasing Act, which 
is also administered by the Department of the Interior.  The Department of 
the Interior was deemed the de facto regulatory authority for offshore oil 
and gas development, despite the paucity of explicit legal authority to 
engage in such leasing, on the basis of its authority to allow mineral 
development on the terrestrial federal public lands.  Indeed, in its 
proposals, the House would have made nine sections of the federal 
Mineral Leasing Act directly applicable to the continental shelf.119  It also 
turned to that Act for precedent on how to divide royalties from mineral 
development on the continental shelf with states.120 
In describing earlier bills on the same subject, the House equated 
the continental shelf to new territory acquired under international law 
doctrines of discovery or conquest.  The House’s proposed legislation 
would have brought “the lands and resources within such areas into the 
same legal status as those acquired by the United States through cession or 
annexation; in the alternative, such lands and resources are subject to the 
doctrine of discovery.”121  Building on this Article’s suggestion at the end 
of Part II, the House thus arguably viewed the OCS as new federal public 
lands that had to be incorporated into existing public land law. 
 
C. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 
  Despite the House of Representatives’ impulse to address both 
continental shelf jurisdiction and OCS oil and gas leasing, exploration, and 
development in one statute, Congress as a whole chose to address the 
latter activities separately, about three months after it enacted the 
Submerged Lands Act, in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
                                                          
 118.  Id. at 1391-93. 
 119.  Id. at 1404. 
 120.  H.R. Rpt. 83-215 at 1413-14. 
 121.  Id. at 1407. 
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(“OCSLA”).122  The OCSLA also made clear that the OCS is under U.S. 
jurisdiction and that federal and, to some extent, state laws apply to oil and 
gas operations on those submerged lands.123 
  The OCSLA is very much a companion statute to the Submerged 
Lands Act.  For example, the OCSLA defines the “outer continental shelf” 
to which it applies by reference to the Submerged Lands Act.  The “outer 
continental shelf” is “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the 
area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this 
title [the Submerged Lands Act], and of which the subsoil and seabed 
appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and 
control.”124  The OCSLA also borrows heavily from federal public lands 
statutes governing terrestrial mineral and energy development, suggesting 
strongly that Congress viewed the Outer Continental Shelf as a form of 
federal public lands, at least so far as developing these resources was 
concerned.  For example, the OCSLA defines the “minerals” to which it 
applies with reference to the federal public land statutes.  In OCSLA’s 
current form, “minerals” means “oil, gas, sulphur, geopressured-
geothermal and associated resources, and all other minerals which are 
authorized by an Act of Congress to be produced from ‘public lands’ as 
defined in section 1702 of this title.”125  This cross-reference to federal 
public land law explicitly excludes the OCS from federal public lands 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”),126 creating a 
perfect parallelism of regulatory regimes for federal lands: the OCSLA 
governs the OCS while other statutes govern federal terrestrial lands, but 
the regimes are otherwise parallel regulatory schemes for assigning 
mineral interests in federal lands. 
  That parallelism is more evident in the original OCSLA than is 
evident in the amended version today.  As originally enacted, the OCSLA 
made clear that it was a mineral leasing statute and that it was superseding 
similar statutes for terrestrial public lands.  The OCSLA originally focused 
                                                          
 122.  Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (Aug. 7, 1953) (codified at 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006)). For a contemporary account of the OCSLA’s 
passage and import, see generally Christopher, supra n. 4. 
 123.  43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
 124.  Id. at § 1331(a). 
 125.  Id. at § 1331(q). The cross-reference now references the definition of 
Bureau of Lands Management (“BLM”) public lands in the Federal Lands 
Management & Policy Act (“FLPMA”), discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra. See 
43 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2006) (defining “public lands”). 
 126.  Id. at § 1702(a). 
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on “mineral leases,” which it defined to be “any form of authorization for 
the exploration for, or development or removal of deposits of, oil, gas, or 
other minerals . . . .”127  Similarly, Congress extended the federal 
Constitution and federal statutes to the Outer Continental Shelf “to the 
same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive 
Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided, however, That 
mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued 
only under the provisions of this Act.”128  As Warren Christopher noted in 
a contemporaneous article on the Act, “[t]he provision that federal laws 
apply to the outer Shelf as if it were ‘an area of exclusive Federal 
jurisdiction located within a state’ solved the drafting problem in 
connection with federal laws which might be interpreted as being limited 
in their application to continental United States.”129 
  The OCS, therefore, was just like terrestrial federal public lands, 
except that the OCSLA governed mineral leasing there.  Notably, the 
OCSLA is and has been codified into Title 43 of the United States Code, 
which is entitled “Public Lands.”  In addition, Congress’ declaration of 
policies in amendments to the OCSLA confirm that Congress thought of 
the OCS as public lands.  In the OCSLA, Congress established a U.S. 
policy that “the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf 
appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, 
and power of disposition as provided in” the Act.130  Moreover, “the outer 
Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the Federal 
Government for the public, which should be made available for 
expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental 
safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of 
competition and other national needs . . . .”131 Congress also has 
emphasized that the purpose of the OCSLA was to provide a method for 
distributing OCS lands for development—albeit by leases, not by deed.132   
                                                          
 127.  Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 2(c), 67 Stat. 462, 462 (Aug. 7, 1953). 
 128.  Id. at § 4(a)(1), 67 Stat. at 462. 
 129.  Christopher, supra n. 4, at 42. 
 130.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1332(1) (2006). 
 131.  Id. at § 1332(3). 
 132.  See id. §§ 1334 (putting the Secretary of the Interior in charge of the 
leasing regime and regulations for it and specifying when leases can be cancelled); 
1335 (providing for validation of leases that existed before the OCSLA’s enactment, 
especially leases procured under state law); 1337 (describing the bidding system); 
1338 (designating how revenues should be disposed of); 1340 (describing exploration 
plan requirements); 1344 (outlining the federal leasing program). 
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Moreover, as is true under the general common law of federal public 
lands, Congress exempted from the OCSLA leasing process portions of 
the OCS already reserved to other purposes—“any unit of the National 
Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, or National Marine 
Sanctuary System, or any National Monument.”133  The OCSLA also 
explicitly reserves the President’s authority to withdraw unleased OCS 
lands from disposition under the Act.134  The OCSLA, in other words, 
treats the OCS as new federal public lands, subject to further 
congressional reservation, Presidential withdrawal, and disposition 
through leases by the Secretary of the Interior. 
V. LATER CONGRESSIONAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
  While the Submerged Lands Act and the OCSLA remain the two 
primary federal statutes governing offshore submerged lands, Congress 
has since enacted several other statutes that also bear on the status of these 
lands as federal public lands.  These statutes emphasize that the question 
“are offshore submerged lands or the Outer Continental Shelf public 
lands?” has no acontextual, a priori answer. Instead, the only relevant 
question is whether these lands qualify as federal public lands for a 
particular purpose or use. 
  Congress has continued to describe the nation’s OCS as public 
lands, especially with respect to energy development and production.  For 
example, in connection with the 1978 amendments to the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, the House of Representatives’ committee 
report on the legislation repeatedly referred to the outer continental shelf 
as public lands.135   Similarly, in reports on legislation replacing the 
Minerals Management Service in the wake of the BP/Deepwater Horizon 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at § 1337(p)(10). See also id. at § 1340(h) (“The Secretary shall not 
issue a lease or permit for, or otherwise allow, exploration, development, or 
production activities within fifteen miles of the boundaries of the Phillip Burton 
Wilderness . . . unless the State of California issues a lease or permit for, or otherwise 
allows, exploration, development, or production activities on lands beneath navigable 
waters . . . of such State which are adjacent to such Wilderness.”). 
 134.  Id. at § 1341(a). 
 135.  H.R. Rpt. 95-372 (Aug. 29, 1977) (reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1485, 1646-47). See also H.R. Rpt. 108-811 (Jan. 3, 2005) (available at 2005 
WL 147925) (referring to “an inventory of estimated undiscovered oil and gas 
resources beneath public lands (including the outer continental shelf)” and hence 
considering the outer continental shelf to be public lands). 
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oil spill in 2010, the Senate committee report noted that there is federal 
revenue from “both offshore and onshore mineral development on public 
lands.”136  Most recently, in 2012, the House of Representatives’ 
committee report on the proposed Energy Security and Transportation 
Jobs Act clearly included the federally controlled OCS as part of the 
federal public lands.137 
  Congress has also defined the OCS as federal public lands in other 
contexts.  For example, the Engle Act explicitly includes the OCS as 
“public lands” that the federal government can withdraw or reserve for 
national defense purposes.138  Similarly, in 1964, Congress explicitly 
included the OCS as part of the “public lands” subject to the Public Land 
Law Review Commission’s review process.139 
  Even in the context of the OCSLA, however, there is room for 
debate on the exact status of the OCS—particularly when control of its 
resources is at stake.  In response to a 1985 proposal to move jurisdiction 
over the OCSLA in the House of Representatives from the Interior 
Committee to the Merchant Marine Committee, for example, the Merchant 
Marine Committee argued strongly that the outer continental shelf did not 
constitute traditional federal public lands.140  According to this argument, 
“[t]he term ‘public lands’ enjoys two centuries of well-established 
meaning as it has been used by the U.S. Congress and interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.  Two fundamental criteria determine whether or not a land 
area constitutes public lands; the holding of title to the area and the ability 
                                                          
 136.  Sen. Rpt. 111-236 (July 28, 2010) (available at 2010 WL 2977946, at 
*14). 
 137.  H.R. Rpt. 112-384 (Feb. 9, 2012) (available at 2012 WL 419823, at 
**11-12). See also Joseph P. Tomain, Smart Energy Path: How Willie Nelson Saved 
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to sell or otherwise dispose of it.”141  The United States, according to this 
argument, had neither title to the OCS nor the authority to dispose of its 
submerged lands; instead, “[e]xcept for the resources related claims of 
jurisdiction over the fisheries and mineral deposits of the OCS, the area is 
international and beyond U.S. control, as recently reiterated by the 
President's Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation.”142  
  This Part examines four other federal statutes under which the 
status of the Outer Continental Shelf as federal public lands became 
relevant but the statute either explicitly defined “public lands” to not 
include the Outer Continental Shelf or was deemed through interpretation 
not to extend to those offshore submerged lands.  Collectively, what these 
statutes suggest most strongly is that the OCS and its resources are 
conclusively not subject to state acquisition and control. 
A. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 
Unlike was the case for many Native American groups in the 
continental United States, the federal government never entered into 
treaties with the various groups of Native Alaskans, leaving their lands 
claims unresolved.  In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claim 
Settlement Act (“ANSCA”)143 after concluding that “there is an 
immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and 
Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims . . . .”144 
  Much of ANCSA operates to designate which lands in Alaska 
belong to Native Alaskan groups and villages, which belong to the State of 
Alaska, and which belong to the federal government.  From the point of 
view of Native Alaskans, the primary impact of ANCSA was to extinguish 
these groups’ claims to aboriginal title to lands: “[a]ll prior conveyances 
of public land and water areas in Alaska, or any interest therein, pursuant 
to Federal law, and all tentative approvals pursuant to section 6(g) of the 
                                                          
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 1084-85.  Jurisdiction over the OCSLA in the House of 
Representatives now belongs to the Natural Resources Committee and the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources.  House Committee on Natural 
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§§ 1601-1629h (2006)). 
 144.  43 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). 
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Alaska Statehood Act, shall be regarded as an extinguishment of the 
aboriginal title thereto, if any.”145 For these purposes, moreover, ANCSA 
defines “public lands” to be: 
all Federal lands and interests therein located in Alaska 
except: (1) the smallest practicable tract, as determined by 
the Secretary, enclosing land actually used in connection 
with the administration of any Federal installation, and (2) 
land selections of the State of Alaska which have been 
patented or tentatively approved under section 6(g) of the 
Alaska Statehood Act, as amended (72 Stat. 341, 77 Stat. 
223), or identified for selection by the State prior to 
January 17, 1969 . . . .146 
  ANCSA’s extinguishment of Native claims also clearly applies to 
submerged lands, including offshore submerged lands.  Specifically, by 
operation of the statute, “[a]ll aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of 
aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and occupancy, including 
submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and 
including any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are 
hereby extinguished.”147  As the federal government began to regulate 
both fishing above and oil and gas development on the Outer Continental 
Shelf off of Alaska, the question became whether this provision extended 
to the Outer Continental Shelf or only to Alaska’s three-mile belt of 
offshore submerged lands. 
  Given the history of public lands disposition in Alaska, the U.S. 
Supreme Court indicated that ANCSA does not extend to the Outer 
Continental Shelf.  As the Court explained in 1987: 
In the Statehood Act, Congress provided that the State of 
Alaska could select over 100 million acres from the 
vacant and unreserved “public lands of the United States 
in Alaska” within 25 years of its admission.  Statehood 
Act § 6(b), 72 Stat. 340. Similarly, in ANCSA, Congress 
allowed Native Alaskans to select approximately 40 
million acres of “Federal lands and interests therein 
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located in Alaska,” with the exception of federal 
installations and land selections of the State of Alaska 
under the Statehood Act. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1602(e), 1610(a), 
1611.  We agree with the Secretary that “[i]t is 
inconceivable that Congress intended to allow either the 
State of Alaska or Native Alaskans to select portions of 
the OCS—‘a vital national resource reserve held by the 
[government] for the public’ (43 U.S.C. 1332(3)).”  Brief 
for Petitioners in No. 85-1406, p. 33. Clearly, the purpose 
of these provisions was to apportion the land within the 
boundaries of the State of Alaska.148 
  ANCSA, or at least the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, as 
prompted by the Secretary of the Interior, would thus seem to suggest that 
the OCS is not part of the “normal” federal public lands.  However, it is 
important to emphasize that the Court was giving strong interpretive 
weight to the phrase “in Alaska” and that it concluded that federal public 
lands “located in Alaska” by definition could not include the OCS because 
Alaska had no claim whatsoever to those submerged lands.149  In context, 
therefore, the Supreme Court’s analysis essentially declares that the OCS 
can in no way become state land, rather than that it can never be 
considered federal public lands. 
B. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 
  Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA)150 in 1976 to provide for comprehensive planning for and 
management of certain federal public lands.  It announced in FLPMA 
national policies to generally keep those lands in federal ownership, to 
engage in federal land use planning for those lands, and to recognize the 
national need for promoting various uses of those lands.151  However, the 
statute narrowly defines “public lands” to mean “any land and interest in 
land owned by the United States within the several States and 
administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land 
                                                          
 148.  Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 
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 149.  Id. at 547-49. 
 150.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (2006). 
 151.  Id. at § 1701(a). 
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Management, without regard to how the United States acquired ownership 
. . . .”152  
  Thus, the federal “public lands” subject to FLPMA’s planning and 
management requirements are limited to lands managed by the federal 
BLM, and FLPMA itself also operates as the BLM’s organic act.  
Congress went further, however, and also explicitly exempted “lands 
located on the Outer Continental Shelf” from the Act’s scope.153  Thus, 
OCS lands are clearly not “public lands” for FLPMA purposes.  
  With regard to this definition, the House Conference Report on 
FLPMA notes only that “[t]he conferees retained the traditional use of the 
term ‘public lands’ (hereinafter referred to as BLM lands) in referring to 
the bulk of the lands administered by BLM.”154   That report thus 
suggested that the OCS was not part of those “traditional” public lands.  
  Nevertheless, Congress’ perceived need to explicitly exempt the 
OCS from FLPMA also cuts another way. If the OCS were clearly not part 
of the federal public lands, no such exemption would be necessary.  The 
explicit exemption of the OCS from FLPMA therefore suggests that 
Congress otherwise considers those offshore submerged lands to be a part 
of  contemporary federal public lands. 
C. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980 
Congress enacted the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)155 in 1980 with three purposes: (1) to 
preserve and protect “certain lands and waters in the State of Alaska that 
contain significant natural, scenic, historic, archeological, geological, 
scientific, wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values;” (2) “to 
preserve and protect “unrivaled scenic and geological values associated 
with natural landscapes,” wildlife habitat, and Alaskan ecosystems; and 
(3) “to provide the opportunity for rural residents [in Alaska] engaged in a 
subsistence water of life to continue to do so.”156  However, ANILCA 
also raised considerable questions for Native Alaskans regarding whether 
it applied to the OCS. 
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ANILCA defines “land” to “mean lands, waters, and interests 
therein,”157 suggesting that submerged lands might be included.  “Federal 
land,” in turn, is “lands the title to which is in the United States after 
December 2, 1980.”158 Finally, the Act defines “public lands” to be: 
land situated in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980, 
are Federal lands, except— 
 
(A) land selections of the State of Alaska which have been 
tentatively approved or validly selected under the Alaska 
Statehood Act and lands which have been confirmed to, 
validly selected by, or granted to the Territory of Alaska 
or the State under any other provision of Federal law; 
 
(B) land selections of a Native Corporation made under 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which have not 
been conveyed to a Native Corporation, unless any such 
selection is determined to be invalid or is relinquished; 
and 
 
(C) lands referred to in section 19(b) of the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act.159 
  ANILCA thus suggested that the federal interests in the OCS off 
the coast of Alaska rendered those submerged lands not only “Federal 
lands” but also “public lands,” at least for purposes of the Act.  The issue 
came to a head when several Native Alaskan Villages claimed aboriginal 
rights to subsistence hunt and fish on the OCS and sought to enjoin oil and 
gas leasing there under ANILCA on the ground that such energy 
development activities would interfere with the Natives’ hunting and 
fishing rights.160  The district court held both that the Villages held no 
such aboriginal rights and that ANILCA did not apply on the Outer 
Continental Shelf.161  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the conclusion regarding aboriginal rights but reversed regarding 
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ANILCA, finding that it did apply to the OCS.162  The Ninth Circuit gave 
two primary reasons for its decision.  First, logically and according to 
legislative history, the geographic scope of ANILCA should be the same 
as the geographic scope of ANCSA, which the Ninth Circuit concluded 
extended to the OCS163 (a conclusion, as discussed above, that the 
Supreme Court later undermined). Second, and more importantly, 
Congress enacted ANILCA’s subsistence provisions in order to benefit the 
Native Alaskans, and under Supreme Court precedent, its scope should be 
interpreted generously and to the benefit of the tribes.164 
  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that, by statutory 
definition, ANILCA “public lands” could not include the OCS.165  The 
Court emphasized that under ANILCA’s definition, quoted above, “public 
lands” are “lands in Alaska,” and that the phrase “in Alaska” 
has a precise geographic/political meaning.  The 
boundaries of the State of Alaska can be delineated with 
exactitude.  The State of Alaska was “admitted into the 
Union on an equal footing with the other States,” and its 
boundaries were defined as “all the territory, together with 
the territorial waters appurtenant thereto, now included in 
the Territory of Alaska.”  Alaska Statehood Act 
(Statehood Act) §§ 1, 2, 72 Stat. 339. The Submerged 
Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 29, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 
1301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), was made 
applicable to the State.  Statehood Act § 6(m), 72 Stat. 
343.  Under § 4 of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 
1312, the seaward boundary of a coastal State extends to a 
line three miles from its coastline.  At that line, the OCS 
commences. OCSLA § 2(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a).  By 
definition, the OCS is not situated in the State of 
Alaska.166 
Moreover, against arguments (and the Ninth Circuit’s finding) that 
Congress had not intended to be so precise, the Supreme Court “reject[ed] 
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the notion that Congress was merely waving its hand in the general 
direction of northwest North America when it defined the scope of 
ANILCA as ‘Federal lands’ ‘situated in Alaska.’  Although language 
seldom attains the precision of a mathematical symbol, where an 
expression is capable of precise definition, we will give effect to that 
meaning absent strong evidence that Congress actually intended another 
meaning.”167 
  As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the OCS off Alaska 
does not qualify as “public lands” for ANILCA purposes.168  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached that decision based on 
ANILCA’s particular definition of “public lands”—not on the basis of 
traditional public land law—and again emphasized that the OCS does not 
belong to the states.  As a result, it is difficult to conclude that either 
ANILCA or the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it resolves for all 
contexts the OCS’s federal public lands status. 
D. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 
  Offshore submerged lands are the sites of more resources of 
interest than just oil and gas, including shipwrecks.  Traditionally, 
recovery of shipwrecks was governed by the federal admiralty or maritime 
law of salvage,169 but the Submerged Lands Act’s assignment of the first 
three miles of offshore submerged lands to the coastal states created issues 
regarding state claims to shipwrecks on that part of the continental 
shelf.170  To resolve at least some of those issues, Congress enacted the 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 in 1988.171 
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  Like the Submerged Lands Act, the Abandoned Shipwreck Act 
operates to increase state control over resources on the first three miles of 
continental shelf. Congress found that “States have the responsibility for 
management of a broad range of living and nonliving resources in State 
waters and submerged lands,” which included “certain abandoned 
shipwrecks, which have been deserted and to which the owner has 
relinquished ownership rights with no retention.”172  Under the somewhat 
convoluted operative provisions of the Act, Congress first proclaimed that 
the United States holds title to “any abandoned shipwreck that is—(1) 
embedded in submerged lands of a State; (2) embedded in coralline 
formations protected by a State on submerged lands of a State; or (3) on 
submerged lands of a State and is included in or determined eligible for 
inclusion in the National Register.”173  The Act then transfers title to such 
shipwrecks “to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is 
located.”174  However, “[a]ny abandoned shipwreck in or on the public 
lands of the United States is the property of the United States 
Government.”175 
  As a result, both “submerged lands” and “public lands” are relevant 
to the proper disposition of abandoned shipwrecks under the Abandoned 
Shipwreck Act.  “Submerged lands” for the Act’s purposes are the 
offshore submerged lands given to coastal states under the Submerged 
Lands Act and similar lands controlled by Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, as defined through other federal statutes.176  “Public 
lands,” in contrast, are defined with reference to the Archaeological 
Resource Protection Act of 1979.177  The definition of “public lands” in 
that Act serves mainly to qualify certain reserved federal lands as “public 
lands” for purposes of protecting archaeological resources.  Thus: 
The term “public lands” means— 
 
                                                          
 172.  Id. at § 2101. 
 173.  Id. at § 2105(a). 
 174.  Id. at § 2105(c). 
 175.  Id. at § 2105(d). 
 176.  Id. at § 2102(f). 
 177.  Pub. L. No. 100-298 at § 2102(c) (referencing 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-
470ll). 
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(A) lands which are owned and administered by the 
United States as part of—  
(i) the national park system, 
 
(ii) the national wildlife refuge system, or 
 
(iii) the national forest system; and 
(B) all other lands the fee title to which is held by the 
United States, other than lands on the Outer Continental 
Shelf and lands which are under the jurisdiction of the 
Smithsonian Institution.178 
  As under FLPMA, Congress explicitly removed the OCS from the 
relevant definition of “public lands,” exempting the OCS from the 
operation of both the Archaeological Resource Protection Act and the 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act.  The latter exemption makes sense because, 
under the terms of the Submerged Lands Act, the states have no claim to 
shipwrecks in the federally controlled OCS.  As a result, the only 
shipwrecks for which the Abandoned Shipwreck Act needed to preserve 
federal title were those on or in federally controlled submerged lands 
within the first three miles of shore or Florida’s and Texas’s extended 
areas of control in the Gulf of Mexico.  
  In contrast, the exemption of the OCS from the Archaeological 
Resource Protection Act, like the exemption in FLPMA, reflects a more 
traditional view of federal public lands.  Nevertheless, the use of an 
explicit exemption also indicates that Congress continued to feel 
compelled clarify when the OCS needed to be removed from the operation 
of particular federal public land laws.  Thus, that Act, like FLPMA, 
suggests that Congress continues to believe that the OCS would otherwise 
be considered part of the contemporary federal public lands. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
  From one perspective, under contemporary federal public land law, 
the status of any particular federal lands as “public lands” has become 
entirely a matter of specific statutory definition: lands reserved for 
                                                          
 178.  16 U.S.C. § 470bb(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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national parks and other purposes are federal “public lands” for purposes 
of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act but not for purposes of 
FLPMA. Like any other federal land, the OCS’s status as “public lands” 
depends on the exact regulatory context at issue. 
  Nevertheless, the public lands debate over the OCS also 
demonstrates that there is something special about these submerged lands.  
First, the continental shelf is a relatively new acquisition, not 
contemplated as part of the traditional federal public lands and often still 
irrelevant to traditional public lands management concerns such as public 
access and recreation.  Second, the OCS is decidedly federal, placed and 
kept beyond the states’ control and jurisdiction except as allowed under 
the Submerged Lands Act.  Finally, fee simple title to the OCS is a fuzzier 
issue than it is for the federal government’s terrestrial lands, leading many 
to conclude that this region can never be considered federal public lands. 
  Nevertheless, in the context of natural resource—and especially 
energy—development, Congress views the OCS as federal public lands on 
which private mineral development is to be encouraged.  While oil spills 
and environmental concerns have tempered the offshore oil rush since 
1953, Congress has never fundamentally changed the idea embedded in 
the OCSLA that the federal government holds the OCS primarily for 
disposal to private development of petroleum, natural gas, and other 
minerals.  As such, the OCS comprises federal lands for which, at least 
until reservation or withdrawal, the United States can dispose of private 
property interests, rendering the OCS meaningfully indistinguishable from 
any other federal public lands.  
 
